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1 Introduction
I suspect the answer to the question in the title of this paper is no. But
the scope of my paper will be considerably more limited: I will be concerned
with whether certain types of considerations that are commonly cited in
favor of dynamic semantics do in fact push us towards a dynamic semantics.
Ultimately, I will argue that the evidence points to a dynamics of discourse
that is best treated pragmatically, rather than as part of the semantics.
There is no doubt a lot to be learned from the work being done in dynamic
semantics. My worry is that the move to a dynamic semantic framework is
often insufficiently motivated, that the argument for dynamic semantics too
often involves a quick move from the observation of dynamic phenomena in
discourse to the conclusion that we need dynamic semantics. I think that
traditional semantic and pragmatic theories have the resources to explain
the same phenomena in similar ways. Furthermore, I think the latter are the
right explanations.
∗Thanks are due to Sam Cumming, Andy Egan, Thony Gillies, Michael Glanzberg, and
Jeff King for helpful comments and discussion. Earlier drafts of this work benefitted from
the comments and questions of the New York Philosophy of Language Workshop, and the
members of Andy Egan’s graduate seminar at Rutgers University. Extra thanks to the
editors of this volume, Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, for their helpful comments and
patience. All mistakes are my own.
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The contrast between dynamic and traditional, static semantics is roughly
as follows. On many traditional views of semantics, a sentence conveys infor-
mation about what the world is or could be like. On this view, to understand
a sentence is to know the conditions under which it is true. The semantic val-
ues of sub-sentential expressions are their contribution to the truth-conditions
of the whole. On dynamic semantic theories, a sentence, as well as expressions
smaller and larger than sentences, convey context change potentials, where a
context is a representation of the state of the conversation, including things
like the information mutually presumed by the conversational participants,
the question(s) currently under discussion, or the objects under discussion
(which I will refer to as discourse referents).1 In other words, the seman-
tic values of expressions are their contribution to the discourse. On this
view semantic content is like instructions on how to update a context. To
understand a sentence is to know how to change the context.
One of the central roles of a semantic theory is to explain what gets
communicated by linguistic expressions (be it sentences, sub-sentential ex-
pressions, or larger chunks of discourse).2 This is not to propose the naive
view that what gets communicated is always and only the semantic value of
expressions, but that these values play some important role in the explana-
tion. I’m interested in the question of what, if anything, adopting a dynamic
semantic framework buys us in terms of explaining communication with lan-
guage. There are lots of interesting questions regarding dynamic semantics
that I will not address in this paper, for reasons of space: 3
A good reason to adopt a new framework over an old one is that it is
in a position to play this role in a better fashion than the old framework.4
In the first half of this paper, I will argue that dynamic semantics doesn’t
obviously put us in a better position. The central difference between dy-
namic and static semantics is whether semantics or pragmatics accounts for
certain features of communication. While static semantics plus pragmatics
1I am remaining neutral on the metaphysics of conversational contexts. They might
be subjective representations in the minds of the conversational participants, or abstract,
objective objects. For now, nothing rests on this distinction.
2See, for example, Yalcin (2012).
3Another interesting question is the question of whether dynamic semantics buys us
something in terms of explaining semantic entailment relations. I will put this question
aside for the purposes of this paper.
4By framework I mean the very general idea behind all dynamic semantic theories that
meanings are context change potentials. There are differing semantic theories within this
framework.
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seems to face in principle problems in accounting for discourse dynamics, I
will argue that these problems are merely the result of a narrow conception
of the resources that static semantics and pragmatics have available. In par-
ticular, I will argue that much of the case for dynamic semantics relies either
explicitly or tacitly on a conception of the static semantics of sentences as
propositions conceived as sets of truth-supporting worlds, and of pragmatics
as a) working off the contents of entire sentences and b) something that can-
not deliver the sort of systematic explanations warranted by the linguistic
data. I will argue that once we give up some of these assumptions, it becomes
apparent that dynamic semantics does not give us new expressive resources
when it comes to explaining discourse dynamics.5 In other words, we can
accept that contexts look much like the dynamic semanticist describes them,
and that updates happen in much the same way as dynamic semantics de-
scribes, but deny that these updates are part of semantics. Rather, we can
keep traditional, static contents and adopt a dynamic pragmatics. In the
second half of the paper, I will argue that there are good reasons to think
pragmatic explanations are more explanatorily fruitful than their dynamic
semantic counterparts. Dynamic semantics treats discourse dynamics as a
systematic phenomenon — this is supposed to be an advantage — but I will
argue the data is not nearly as systematic as the treatment supposes. The
static semantic/dynamic pragmatic account naturally explain the variances
in the relevant data that dynamic semantics cannot naturally account for.
Furthermore, many of the discourse updates are the sorts of updates we per-
form on non-linguistic information as well. Pragmatic principles, which I
understands in a broadly neo-Gricean way, are general principles of rational,
co-operative activity and not special to conversation.6 These naturally ex-
plain this similarity between non-linguistically and linguistically motivated
updates to the context. We simply miss important generalizations if we treat
information flow throught a discourse as part of the semantics.
5Again, this is not to deny that dynamic semanticsm might give us more expressive
resources when it comes to some other phenomena or that there is some other advantage
to the dynamic framework.
6In fact, I think of neo-Gricean pragmatics in an extremely broad way, in that any
explanation that appeals to general principles governing rational activities counts as prag-
matic, even if we give up the co-operativity idea. In this broad sense, even certain kinds of
game-theoretic explanations count as what I mean by pragmatic. Nor do I mean to take
on board any of Grice’s specific views.
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2 Background
As I said, dynamic semantics takes the semantic value of a sentence to be
its context change potential (CCP), and the meaning of sub-sentential ex-
pressions to be their contribution to the context change potential. On a
traditional, static semantics, the semantic focus is on the sentence (relative
to a context), whereas on a dynamic semantics the semantic focus is on the
sentence (or sub-sentential expression) as part of discourse, relative to both
an input and output context. Consequently, adopting such a framework is
supposed to put us in a better position to capture certain data about the
dynamics of discourse, certain robust and seemingly systematic phenomena
that involve the flow of information throughout a discourse. Static seman-
tics is often portrayed as being unable to account for: the two-way interac-
tion between context and content, the fact that the order of sentences and
sub-sentential expressions in a discourse matters for what is communicated,
and that sentences often communicate more than merely truth-conditional
content. Here are some examples that have commonly been taken to be
suggestive of the need for dynamic semantics.
1. Cross-sentential anaphora
(1) a. Jodie dropped ten marbles and found all of them, except for
one.
b. It is probably under the couch.
(2) a. Jodie dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them.
b. ?? It is probably under the couch.7
There are two (related) challenges that discourses involving cross-sentential
anaphora allegedly present for the static semanticist. First, the first
sentences of each of the above discourses, though truth-conditionally
equivalent, differ in their licensing abilities — (1a) licenses a singular
pronoun (but not a plural one) and (2a) licenses a plural pronoun (but
not a singular one). Second, the examples involve unbound pronouns.
The pronoun in (1b) gets its value, somehow, from one in the preceding
sentence, even though it is neither syntactically bound by it, nor can
7This is a slight variation on an example originally due to Barbara Partee, and discussed
in Heim (1982), Kamp (1988), and Groenendijk & Stokhof (1999), among others.
4
2 Background Karen S. Lewis
it co-refer with it in any traditional sense (since one is not a referring
term).
Considering the first problem first, the idea is that somehow (1a) and
(2a) must change the context in different ways. This would explain
why we are in different positions when it comes to the felicity of (1b)
and (2b). The problem is not that there is no way to update a con-
text in a static framework. On the contrary, it is commonly agreed
that it is easy to define a pragmatically motivated operation on static
propositions that updates the conversational context. Following Stal-
naker (1978) (among others), we can think of the information mutually
presumed by the conversational participants at any given point in the
conversation as the common ground, and we can usefully model the
common ground using a context set — the set of worlds that are epis-
temically (or doxastically) open given the common ground. When an
assertion has been accepted in a conversation, rational participants
won’t keep worlds open that are ruled out by the newly accepted in-
formation. This is naturally modelled as intersection: intersect the
proposition (conceived as a set of truth-supporting worlds) with the
context set. The new context set will retain all the worlds from the in-
put context that do not conflict with the content of what was asserted.
Now it should be clear what the complaint about (1) and (2) is: (1a)
and (2a) are truth-conditionally equivalent. If we take content to be
truth-supporting worlds and update the context as just described (sup-
posing that the input context is the same), the output context will be
the same. But when we come to (1b), the context licenses the singular
pronoun but not so for (2b). The dynamic semanticist’s challenge to
static semantics is that some other change to the context must be in-
curred by processing (1a) and (2a), respectively. Though not generally
explicitly noted, this challenge must include the assumption that this
change can’t be defined by a pragmatically motivated operation that
acts on static propositions.
For example, Gillies (2004) writes that this example provides prima fa-
cie evidence that meaning is more than merely truth-conditional, that
“semantics is richer than propositional content” (p.597), which in turn
provides evidence for a framework like dynamic semantics which takes
meaning to be this richer sort of thing. Heim (1982) argues that tradi-
tional, static theories of cross-sentential anaphora cannot account for
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this example without appealing to the wording of the two sentences to
explain the difference. She claims that the phenomenon in question is
a systematic one and a dynamic account can give a more systematic
explanation than one that appeals to the wording (p.21-22). Groe-
nendijk & Stokhof (1999) claim that this example leads to the conclu-
sion that “the two opening sentences differ in meaning, and that hence
truth-conditional content and meaning cannot be equated” and that
therefore this example shows that “truth-conditional content is not the
basic notion that oils the wheels of the interpretation engine” (p.52).
On a dynamic semantic framework one can say that (1a) encodes an
instruction to update the context not only with the truth-conditional
information, but with a discourse referent for the one missing marble
(this instruction is encoded in the semantics for one).8 When we get
to (1b), the singular pronoun has a discourse referent on which to pick
up. On the other hand, (2a) introduces no such discourse referent for
the missing marble, and thus when we get to (2b), there is no discourse
referent for it to pick up on. Discourse referents represent informa-
tion about the discourse itself — the objects that are under discussion
in the discourse — rather than information directly about the world.
(A discourse referent is an abstract representation of an object under
discussion; it is neither an individual in the world/model nor a lin-
guistic expression.) Hence, it seems that dynamic semantics is in a
better position to explain the communication of discourse information,
information about the discourse itself.
The very same aspect of the dynamic theory provides an answer to
the second challenge as well (how to account for unbound anaphoric
pronouns). Most static theories treat unbound pronouns as e-type or
d-type—some form of disguised definite description.9 This is not the
place to argue against that sort of theory, but just to point out that
8Here I am glossing over some important differences between different dynamic semantic
theories of anaphora. For example, theories like Heim’s File Change Semantics (FCS)
treat indefinites as contributing a variable, as does the pronoun, both of which are bound
by a higher quantifier. On Groenendijk and Stokhof’s Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL),
indefinites are treated as existential quantifiers, which change the assignment functions in
the context such that they can bind variables to the right outside of their syntactic scope.
9Another static theory — Context Dependent Quantifier theory – also treats pronouns
as disguised quantifiers, but the type of quantifier varies with the context. In this example
the quantifier would be an indefinite description.
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dynamic semantics opens up new strategies for dealing with unbound
pronouns. The context change potentials of certain kinds of expressions
(such as indefinites) add information about the objects under discus-
sion to the context; this updated information acts as the input context
to subsequent sentences that may contain pronouns. Proponents of
dynamic semantics (rightly, I think) point out that this captures an in-
tuitive idea about the dynamics of discourse: sentences in a discourse
do not provide isolated information; rather, information flows through-
out a discourse.
2. Intra-sentential anaphora
(3) a. A pregnant woman got on the subway and I gave her my
seat.
b. ?? I gave her my seat and a pregnant woman got on the
subway.
(4) If a nun owns a book, she reads it.
On any dynamic theory, and is not commutative; rather and encodes
an instruction to update first with the first conjunct and then with the
second.10 In example (3a), the first conjunct introduces a new discourse
referent for a pregnant woman; by the time we get to processing the
second conjunct, there is consequently a discourse referent on which the
pronoun her can pick up. By contrast, when the order of the conjuncts
is switched in (3b), we first have to update with the first conjunct, and
there is no appropriate discourse referent for the pronoun.11 This ex-
plains both the infelicity of (3b), and why it is hard, if not impossible,
to hear her as being coreferential with a pregnant woman. On the other
10Some claim that the non-commutativity of and is the hallmark of a dynamic theory.
For example, Groenendijk & Stokhof (1989) write: “A semantics is dynamic if and only
if its notion of conjunction is dynamic, and hence non-commutative.” (p.13). This can’t
be quite right – for there are theories that take content to be ordinary propositions, but
and is not commutative (e.g. Jeff King (2007)) and there could be theories that take
content to be context change potentials but define the CCP of and as commutative. It
is in fact true that all existing dynamic semantics, as far as I know, define conjunction
non-commutatively.
11Of course, there might be some other discourse referent around if this sentence doesn’t
occur discourse-initially, but it won’t be a discourse referent for the pregnant woman.
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hand, on a static framework, and is generally commutative. One might
therefore expect (3a) and (3b) to express the same truth-conditional
content and be equally felicitous. Again, this is an example of where
adopting a dynamic framework seems to have the advantage in explain-
ing what gets communicated in terms of discourse information and the
effect that order has on what gets communicated in a discourse.
In (4), an example of donkey anaphora, the pronouns in the consequent
of the conditional are also unbound. In this case, on a dynamic semantic
framework, a nun and a book in the antecedent introduce discourse
referents into the context that are picked up by the pronouns in the
consequent. Such a view presents no prima facie problem for dynamic
semantics (this is not to say that specific accounts of donkey anaphora
are not problematic) because sub-sentential expressions can also convey
CCPs. On the other hand, if the output of the semantic theory is the
truth-conditional content of entire sentences, it remains to be explained
both how the context is updated with discourse information, and how
this happens sub-sententially.12
3. Counterfactuals
(5) a. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro
dance; but of course,
b. if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind
someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro dance.
(6) a. If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind
someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro dance; but of
course
b. ?? if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen
Pedro dance.13
Roughly, the sequence in (5) seems acceptable because (5a) is not eval-
uated relative to any possibilities that conflict with its truth; (5b) sub-
12Donkey anaphora also presents the additional problem of explaining how the indefinite
gets a universal interpretation, but like dynamic semantics, static semantics should appeal
to the interaction between the semantics of the indefinite and conditional. As in the case
of cross-sentential unbound anaphora, most static theories of donkey anaphora appeal to
e-type or d-type theories of pronouns.
13Example is from Gillies (2007)
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sequently introduces into the conversation the more remote possibility
that Sophie gets stuck behind someone tall, and so, it too, seems true.
By contrast, in the reverse discourse, (6a) introduces the possibility
that Sophie gets stuck behind someone tall, and when we reach (6b)
we cannot ignore this possibility since it has been introduced into the
conversation already. Thus (6b) is unacceptable. Again, the fact that
the order of the utterances makes a difference in interpretation or ac-
ceptability is taken as evidence that the relationship between sentences
in a counterfactual discourse is relevant to their semantics. Since dy-
namic semantic contents are context change potentials, it seems natural
to represent these observations in the framework: a counterfactual is
always evaluated relative to the context in which it is uttered and in
turn changes that very context.14
These are not the only examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate
the move to a dynamic framework, but they are representative of the central
motivating data. I think the same sorts of considerations that demonstrate
that pragmatic explanations have better resources to explain these phenom-
ena extend to the phenomena I have not mentioned (such as presupposition,
questions, and epistemic modals).
3 Discourse dynamics and communication
I want to challenge the idea that dynamic semantics is in a better position
than static semantics to explain the sort of phenomena outlined above. There
are many detailed dynamic semantic accounts out there, and it is not the task
of the current paper to evaluate them or offer rival accounts. Rather, I want
to address the question of whether discourse phenomena like the ones out-
lined in the previous section should motivate us to adopt a theory within
the dynamic semantic framework or not. The question is whether these phe-
nomena exert pressure on us to change our basic semantic notion to that
of context change potential. I will argue that they don’t; static semantics
plus a dynamic pragmatics has the resources to account for information flow
through a discourse: the two-way interaction between context and content,
the communication of discourse information, and the effect of the order on
14Roughly this argument is made in von Fintel (2001) and Gillies (2007), though I will
look at Gillies’ more nuanced argument in more detail in §3.3.
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acceptability, interpretation, and truth. As I said before, on the static se-
mantic/dynamic pragmatic view, contexts, conceived as representations of
the state of the conversation, are the same as those in the dynamic semantic
theory. Likewise, utterances do have the effect of changing the context. But
on this view, context change is not a semantic notion.15
I think the case for dynamic semantics depends on a narrow conception of
the range of semantic theories available to the static semanticist as well as a
narrow conception of what pragmatics can do. Specifically, the arguments for
dynamic semantics ubiquitously assume that the content of static sentences
are propositions conceived as sets of truth-supporting worlds. But there are
at least two other kinds of semantic objects that could be the content of sen-
tences within a static framework: structured propositions or unstructured
sets that contain more than just worlds (e.g. sets that also contain assign-
ment functions or information states). In the case of pragmatics, arguments
for dynamic semantics often assume that pragmatics does not operate sub-
sententially and that pragmatics can’t deliver explanations of (seemingly)
systematic phenomena. I argue that neither of these assumptions is right.
The question I want to consider is not merely whether a static seman-
tics can account for the linguistic data that motivates dynamic semantics —
there are already static theories of the various phenomena out there (such
as the e-type theory of anaphora), and the present project is not to evaluate
their merits or flaws. Rather, I want to take seriously the dynamic semantic
notion that information flows throughout a discourse, that content and con-
text have a two-way interaction, that discourse information is part of what
gets communicated, and argue that static semantics plus pragmatics has the
resources to give this dynamic style of explanation of what’s going on.
3.1 Case study 1: Cross-sentential Anaphora
I said before that the notion that dynamic semantics is in a better position to
account for discourse dynamics relies on the assumption that static semantic
contents are sets of truth-supporting worlds and that pragmatics works off
only these contents. If the only semantic value we have to work with is a
set of worlds (or similar object, such as a set of situations), and we maintain
15A good example of work that takes dynamic pragmatics seriously is the work of Craige
Roberts; see for example Roberts (2004, ms). Of course, David Lewis (1979) and Robert
Stalnaker (1978, 1998) are predecessors of this view. Philippe Schlenker (2008) also ex-
emplifies what I have in mind.
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the idea that these are the only input to pragmatics, then the pragmatically
motivated update operations available to be defined are limited by what we
can do with such a set. If semantic content provides only truth-conditional
information, then it is mysterious as to where updates about other sorts
of information come from. But if we have different sorts of semantic values
acting as the input to pragmatics, different sorts of updates become available,
because the semantic values provide additional information. And if we give
up that pragmatics acts only on the content of sentences, different sorts of
updates also become available. I illustrate this point here by suggesting some
ways in which these assumptions can (indeed, should) be given up.
Many philosophers who work in the static, truth-conditional tradition
hold that propositions are structured.16 There are many different views of
structured propositions, but the basic idea is that structured propositions are
complex entities made up of parts, and these parts reflect the semantic values
of the elements of the relevant sentence. Furthermore, the constituents of a
structured proposition are also generally thought to be bound together in
a way that reflects the structure of the sentence. To return to the marble
example, on any well-known view of structured propositions (1a) and (2a)
do not express the same proposition. The proposition expressed by (1a) will
contain the semantic value of one (or, a constituent that is determined, at
least in part, by the semantic value of one), while the proposition expressed
by (2a) will contain the semantic value of nine (or a constituent determined
at least in part by it).
In fact, the problem raised for the possible worlds view by the marble
example is not all that different from the sort of problems proponents of
structured propositions have been raising against the view for decades. The
possible worlds view predicts that truth-conditionally equivalent sentences
express the same proposition, and people have objected that this is not a
fine-grained enough account of propositions. It becomes particularly prob-
lematic when propositions are embedded under attitudes, since it seems not
everyone who believes one proposition believes everything truth-conditionally
equivalent to it. In the same way as sets of worlds propositions aren’t fine
grained enough to play their roles when it comes to belief, they may also not
be fine grained enough to play their roles in discourse.
Not only do (1a) and (2a) have different contents on the structured propo-
16For example, King (2007), Soames (1985, 1987, 1989), Salmon (1986a,b, 1989a,b),
Lewis (1972), and Creswell (1985), not to mention Russell and Frege.
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sitions view, but they are different in just the sort of way we’d expect, given
the difference in anaphora licensing in the examples. The structured propo-
sition expressed by (1a) actually contains a constituent reflecting the fact
that one marble was mentioned in the utterance. The structured proposition
expressed by (2a) contains a constituent reflecting the fact that nine marbles
were mentioned in the utterance. Thus, given some additional assumptions
about the nature of contexts and how they are updated, it is unsurprising
that the output context of (1a) contains some sort of representation that
there is one missing marble under discussion, while the the output context
of (2a) represents nine found marbles as being under discussion. After all,
these are respectively represented in the semantic content of what was said.
A structured proposition not only represents the way the world is, but also
represents the way in which the information was presented. It reflects the
structure of the sentence, which is a fact about the discourse. In this way,
structured propositions can be said to encode discourse information.
Of course, structured propositions themselves don’t encode instructions
on how to update the context with the relevant discourse information. But
unstructured propositions don’t encode instructions on how to update the
context with truth-conditional information. Rather, based on the informa-
tion the unstructured proposition give us, we can give a pragmatically moti-
vated explanation of the appropriate update (recall the Stalnakerian updates
on the context set described earlier). The problem with unstructured propo-
sitions is that they gave us truth-conditional information and nothing more
— we couldn’t look inside them, so to speak, and see the structure of the
sentence behind them. But structured propositions give us more informa-
tion, and in this case, just the right sort of information we need to explain
the difference in the discourses. I haven’t yet given you a pragmatic update
rule (I will below), but it is no longer mysterious where such a rule might
come from, since the relevant information is right there in the content.
I don’t mean to argue that we need give up semantic contents as sets of
truth-supporting worlds in order to account for the dynamics of discourse;
we can give up some assumptions about pragmatics instead. Nor do I mean
to imply that the above is the only revision a static semanticist can make to
static contents.17 The above merely illustrates one good option.
17See Yalcin (2011) for such an example. Yalcin treats epistemic modals in a way that
mimics the dynamic account without making use of dynamic semantics; rather he relies
entirely on static semantics conceived as sets of worlds and information states.
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Heim thought it a downside of a potential pragmatic account of anaphora
that it would have to rely on the words used and not just semantic content
to account for cases like the marble example. But I don’t see this as a
particularly undesirable aspect of a pragmatic account. After all, one of
Grice’s four maxims, the maxim of manner, deals not in content but in form:
be clear (avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief, be orderly).
But regardless of whether Grice himself thought so or not, it is reasonable to
suppose that rational agents engaged in co-operative communicative activity
reason based not only on the content of a sentence but also on the particular
words used. As I argued in Lewis (2012), if we think of wording as reflecting
a speaker’s discourse plans, the explanation is also systematic and predictive.
If I’m right about this, then even if one maintains that semantic contents are
sets of truth-supporting worlds, pragmatics has the resources to explain the
difference between the marble cases.
If we maintain that the content of a sentence is a set of truth-supporting
worlds, one already has to accept that certain things are going to depend
on the words used rather than the content, since this way of thinking of
content just doesn’t cut the grain fine enough. For example, belief reports
will have to rely on modes of presentation or some such thing, either to
explain their differing truth values (on a semantic view) or explain why it
seems to the agent, speaker, or listener that there is a difference in truth value
even if there really is none (on a pragmatic view). While the marble cases is
different because nearly everyone (except those really bad at math) know that
the sentences are truth-conditionally equivalent, we can still appeal to the
wording (or modes of presentation) to explain why it is clear to the discourse
participants that the conversation is headed in different directions. Even
for those who know that Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens name the same
person, using one name indicates a plan to talk about the individual qua
writer while the other doesn’t. Similarly, choosing to mention the missing
marble reveals a different discourse plan than choosing to mention the nine
found ones. I myself prefer the structured propositions view, but think this
is also a theory with enough resources to be worth pursuing.
Whether or not we choose to adopt structured propositions or the notion
that pragmatics works off both content and wording, the pragmatic update
rule for adding a new discourse referent can be explained in essentially the
same way. Recall the lesson from the Stalnakerian pragmatic update on
propositional content: it explains why informational content has the effect
it does on the context by appealing to general features of conversation qua
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rational activity with the purpose of gaining information. Similarly, we can
explain why indefinites, in many contexts, affect the context by adding a
new discourse referent by appealing to general features of conversation qua
rational, (generally) co-operative activity. The pragmatic explanation of the
update rule requires taking a few assumptions on board, but these are entirely
assumptions I think we should make anyway, and nothing specific to the case
of indefinite descriptions. First, to follow a conversation, participants must
keep track of the objects under discussion (this should be fairly obvious, in
that many conversations involve objects under discussion over the course of
multiple utterances, though it is further required by the fact that language
is anaphoric and some subsequent utterances will simply be unintelligible if
the participants are not keeping track of the objects under discussion). Ob-
jects under discussion are just what I’ve been referring to by the technical
term discourse referent. So in a well-run conversation, conversational partic-
ipants must keep track of discourse referents as well as informational content.
Second, rational, co-operative activity involves planning. Even in the most
casual of conversations, speakers have local (i.e. short term) discourse plans
(or at least plans in the sense of constraining the possible ways the discourse
can go). These plans have to be recognizable — if the speaker’s discourse
plans are not recognizable to the participants, the discourse plans for the
conversation will not be cohesive. (For example, one person might intro-
duce a question under discussion, but no one will answer it because the plan
wasn’t recognizable.) Recognizing the speaker’s plans supports expectations
of where the conversation will or can go. (For example, recognizing that a
speaker has introduced a question under discussion supports the expectations
that someone in the conversation will go on to try to answer it.)
To better understand the pragmatic derivation of the update rule add
discourse referent, consider a simple case of cross-sentential anaphora as in:
(7) a. A woman walked in.
b. She sat down.
Take the semantics of the indefinite to be that of the ordinary existential
quantifier. By assumption, then, the indefinite doesn’t pick out any particu-
lar discourse referent or object in the world. Assuming that a speaker is being
co-operative and making relevant contributions, the existential claim must
in some way relate to the conversation. If we think of the state of the con-
versation as represented by the conversational context, then another way of
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stating this is that the utterance has to relate to the evolving conversational
context in some way. Most of the time, the merely existential information
is not all that informative. The more relevant plan involves the objects un-
der discussion. Since the speaker did not use a definite expression in (7a),
which commonly pick up on familiar discourse referents (I’m leaving open
the question of whether the latter is a semantic or pragmatic phenomenon),
the recognizable plan is to introduce a novel discourse referent. Furthermore,
the speaker did not use an existentially entailing expression such as The bar
is not devoid of women, but one which explicitly invoked the term a woman
(or, on the structure propositions account, expressed a proposition that has
an indefinite description, or its components, as a constituent). This is again
most readily understood as a plan to introduce a woman under discussion
(or at least a plan to constrain the conversation such that a woman could be
under discussion). Recognizing such a plan raises the participants’ discourse
expectations that the speaker or someone else will go on to say something
more about the woman under discussion, and so the appropriate discourse
referent is added to the context. This is not to say that all indefinite expres-
sions introduce discourse referents that are later picked up on. Of course we
can make existential claims in discourse without intending to go on and say
more about the object in question. But it would be a very weird conversation
if the speaker(s) made many existential claims and never picked up on any
of them.
Similarly, in the marble example the fact the speaker utters the words ex-
cept for one in (1a) (or expresses a proposition with the relevant constituent)
indicates a plan to potentially go on and talk about the missing marble. This
creates a discourse expectation among the conversational participants that
there is a higher probability that the speaker (or someone else) will now go
on to say something about the missing marble, and therefore participants
update the context with a discourse referent for the missing marble. In (2a)
the speaker chooses different words: she explicitly says the phrase found only
nine of them. This creates the expectation that she is likely to go on and
talk about the nine found marbles, not the missing one, and so the context
is updated with a discourse referent for the nine found marbles, but not the
missing marble.18
18See Lewis (2012) for much more detail on the pragmatic explanation of adding dis-
course referents to the context and Lewis (MS) for how to extend this basic story to
embedded cases.
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Notice that in these cases the update to the context is exactly the same
as the one in the dynamic explanation; the difference is just that the dy-
namic update is part of the semantics of indefinite descriptions, whereas the
static update is a pragmatically motivated operation that typically acts on
assertions of sentences containing indefinite descriptions. The point is that
broadly Gricean pragmatics has more resources than the marble argument
for dynamic semantics allows, and these resources can be exploited to cre-
ate pragmatic update systems that account for discourse data in the same
style as dynamic semantics. It remains to be determined which system bet-
ter captures the right sort of explanation, and which one accounts for the
right entailments, but the point here is that (despite claims to the contrary)
the need for updates to the context regarding discourse information is not
reason enough to adopt the dynamic semantic framework. Static semantics
and traditional pragmatics have the resources to account for these sorts of
updates.19
It might be unsurprising to some that combining structured propositions
with pragmatic update rules (or pragmatic update rules that can effectively
work off the structure of sentences) yields functionally equivalent (or close
to functionally equivalent) results to a dynamic semantics. After all, Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT) is functionally equivalent to dynamic
semantics. And DRT, at its core, involves static structured entities (DRSs)
and construction rules, which not only describe how to construct the DRSs,
but encode the information about context change (such as adding a dis-
course referent). DRT doesn’t consider their DRSs to be propositions or the
construction rules to be pragmatically motivated, but structurally the the-
ory is very similar to the one I am proposing.20 Another way of running the
argument I’ve been making is: DRT is functionally equivalent to dynamic se-
mantics. Structured propositions plus pragmatically motivated update rules
are functionally equivalent to DRT. Therfore, structured propositions plus
pragmatic update rules are functionally equivalent to dynamic semantics.
19There are other pragmatic responses to the marble argument that maintain that con-
tent is a set of truth-supporting rules. I have in mind particularly Stalnaker (1998), who
appeals to the referential intentions of the speaker to explain the difference in output
context. For arguments against this account, see Lewis (Forthcoming).
20There are also idiosyncratic features to Kamp & Reyle (1993)’s version of DRT in-
volving the specific semantics they want to give to specific constructions (e.g. indefinite
descriptions are not quantifiers on their view), but these are not intrinsic features of the
DRT framework.
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3.2 Case Study 2: Intra-sentential Anaphora
In the intra-sentential anaphora cases, the purported problem for static se-
mantics doesn’t rely only on the assumption that truth-conditional content
acts as input to pragmatics, but also on the assumption that pragmatics
doesn’t work off the value of sub-sentential constituents. Recall that in each
example, it seems the context is updated with a novel discourse referent be-
fore the entire sentence is processed: in (4) the context is updated before we
get to the consequent and in (3) before we get to the second conjunct. Dy-
namic semantics has the resources to account for the sub-sentential data in
the same way it accounts for the cross-sentential data because sub-sentential
expressions also express context change potentials. This is not to endorse
any particular dynamic semantic account of anaphora; particular accounts all
have their own problems. The point is simply that this sort of sub-sentential
data is something that the framework is in just as good a position to account
for as the cross-sentential data. On the other hand, it might seem that static
semantics is off the bat in a worse position. This has nothing to do with par-
ticular theories, but with the scope of the framework. If the semantic content
of an entire sentence is the input to pragmatics, then even if the appropriate
updates to the contexts can be pragmatically motivated when it comes to
sentences, the sub-sentential data presents an additional obstacle since the
pragmatic updates don’t apply. But this is no obstacle for the static frame-
work in general. This is again only an obstacle for one, narrow conception of
the static framework — one in which pragmatics works only off of sentence
contents. Anyone who wants to join the ranks of the many philosophers
who already think that pragmatics works at a sub-sentential level has no in
principle obstacle here at all. For example, Levinson (2000), Taylor (2001),
and Simons (2010) all argue, for different reasons, that a broadly Gricean
conception of pragmatics applies at the sub-sentential level. Furthermore,
the reasons people give for pragmatics acting at the sub-sentential level gen-
erally have nothing to do with discourse dynamics. Thus these resources
that enable the static semanticist to deal with sub-sentential updates are
also independently motivated.
There are many arguments for the existence of sub-sentential pragmatics
that are beyond the scope of the present paper, but I think the important
question is to ask whether sub-sentential expressions have a conversational
purpose. The basic idea in Gricean pragmatics is the co-operative principle,
that conversational participants will make contributions appropriate to the
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purpose of the conversation, or stage of the conversation. If we accept that (at
least certain) sub-sentential expressions make conversational contributions,
then the same sort of reasoning that can be performed on the contents of full
sentences can also be performed on the contents of sub-sentential expressions.
Sub-sentential expressions do seem like the sorts of things that interlocutors
can grasp and reason about, and I think that this gives us good reason to
think that pragmatic effects occur based on sub-sentential expressions.21
To name but a few, Simons (2010) and Taylor (2001) offer good arguments
to this effect; they give very different evidence that, taken together, strongly
point to pragmatic reasoning on sub-sentential expressions. For example,
Simons points out that sub-sentential clauses can at times express the main
point of a particular utterance and be addressed by interlocutors. As an
illustration of these phenomena she offers examples like the following:
(8) a. Where did Jane go last week?
b. Henry believes she was interviewing for a job at Princeton.
c. Henry thinks she was interviewing for a job at Princeton.
d. Henry said she was interviewing for a job at Princeton.
e. Henry hinted she was interviewing for a job at Princeton.(p.146)
(9) A: If Jane comes later, we can fill her in.
B: She won’t be coming. (p.147)
In (8), the clause embedded under the propositional attitude verbs is what
answers the initial question. In (9), speaker B — quite naturally — addresses
the claim embedded in the antecedent of the conditional. This is good evi-
dence that sub-sentential clauses have conversational purposes, that they are
the sorts of the things interlocutors grasp and reason about.
Taylor (2001) has a very different argument that points in the same direc-
tion: he argues that the sort of reasoning that goes on in completing propo-
sitional content is the exact same sort of reasoning involved in calculating
implicatures — but the former reasoning involves partial, sub-propositional
content. For example, consider the contrast in what is communicated by the
following two sentences (given that they are uttered in 2013 in the United
States):
21What I take to be the important feature is weaker than what some think is necessary
for motivating pragmatic updates on the context, that is that uttering a sub-sentential
expression involves performing a self-standing speech act.
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(10) I’ve had breakfast.
(11) I’ve had eel.
In a typical scenario (10) conveys that the speaker has had breakfast already
that morning while (11) conveys that the speaker has had eel at some point
in her life. Succeeding in communicating these contents, respectively, relies
on the speaker’s intentions and the mutual world knowledge of speaker and
interlocutors: that we live in a society in which people eat breakfast every
day, but not one in which we eat eel every day. As Taylor points out, the
interpretations can easily be flipped if we change facts about the context:
(10) can get the at some point in the past interpretation if we’re talking to
a dinner-eater in a society of people who each eat only one meal a day (i.e.
there are breakfast eaters, lunch eaters, and dinner eaters). (11) can get the
already today interpretation if we imagine we’re at a sushi tasting event and
everyone at the event is trying to insure that everyone gets at least one taste
of each kind of sushi. Since this reasoning is required for figuring out the
proposition expressed by the speaker, it has to work off partial content. So
again, partial contents seem to be the sorts of things interlocutors can grasp
and reason about.
Finally, Stalnaker (1978) points out that interlocutors reason (at least
about certain things) as the speaker is speaking – not afterwards on the
entire content. For example, as he says, “when I speak, I pressupose that
others know I am speaking, even if I do not assume that anyone knew I was
going to speak before I did.”(p.86) Rather, when I begin speaking, I expect
them to update with the commonplace fact that I am speaking, and this can
furthermore be useful in conversation, as this is how they know who is tired
when I say “I am tired” — and they don’t have to wait until the end of the
sentence to figure that out. Again, all this evidence points to the conclusion
that sub-sentential or sub-propositional pragmatic reason is all too common.
Thus static semantics has no prima facie problem with donkey anaphora
either, since updates can occur mid-sentence. The same sort of reasoning
that I argued for in the previous section regarding discourse referent update
based on entire sentences can be applied at the sub-sentential level.22
22See Lewis (MS) for a more detailed discussion of these arguments and account of
donkey anaphora on a static semantic/dynamic pragmatic framework.
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3.3 Case study 3: Counterfactual conditionals
To return to the case of counterfactuals, the problem once again stems from
assumptions about the limits of a pragmatic explanation. Recall that the
two counterfactuals in (5) (the Sobel sequence) seem true, and in fact ac-
cording to most semantics for counterfactuals both come out as true.23 If
the context gets updated with nothing but truth-conditional content, revers-
ing the order of the two counterfactuals shouldn’t make a difference to their
truth — updating with one truth generally doesn’t make another, compat-
ible truth go false. The upshot is that a counterfactual doesn’t just affect
the context in terms of a truth-conditional contribution, but also in terms of
which worlds are in the domain for evaluating a subsequent counterfactual.
To use the terminology from the standard semantics for counterfactuals, the
observation in this case is that one of the effects of a counterfactual on the
context is to determine which worlds are part of the domain of closest worlds.
(6a) expands the domain of closest worlds to include ones in which Sophie
is stuck behind someone tall at the parade. Given this context, (6b) is false.
(Gillies and von Fintel argue for treating counterfactuals as strict condition-
als with contextually determined domains, but this is not the only way the
same result can be accomplished.)
Both Gillies and von Fintel argue that this calls for a dynamic semantics.
For example, von Fintel writes:
There are essentially dynamic facts concerning the way the or-
der of counterfactuals in a sequence matters to the coherence of
the sequences and to the plausibility of arguments. These facts
demonstrate the need for context-change in the semantics of coun-
terfactuals.(von Fintel, 2001, p.7)
Gillies also begins by jumping from a concern about the effect a counterfac-
tual has on the context to talking in terms of CCPs as part of the semantics
of counterfactuals, though ultimately he has a more nuanced argument for
why the semantics of counterfactuals have to be CCPs. But before I turn
to Gillies’ argument, which involves looking at might-counterfactuals as well
as would-counteractuals (mights and woulds for short), let’s examine how
a pragmatic account could explain the data from Sobel and reverse Sobel
sequences.
23Gillies and von Fintel use the data as an argument against the Lewis-Stalnaker se-
mantics for counterfactuals, but really it is a more general argument than this.
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Gillies and von Fintel both argue that counterfactuals have presupposi-
tions on their antecedent, namely a counterfactual If P, would Q presupposes
that there are some P-worlds in the relevant domain. They both want to treat
this presupposition in terms of a CCP: processing the counterfactual includes
changing the relevant domain to add P-worlds if there are none, otherwise
the process idles. Taking counterfactuals to be sensitive to the contextually
determined domain, which can be updated as just described, explains the
difference between discourses like (5) and (6). In (5a), the relevant domain is
expanded to include the closest worlds in which Sophie goes to the parade;24
these are all worlds in which she sees Pedro dance, and so the counterfactual
comes out true. The presupposition of (5b) expands the domain to include
the closest worlds in which Sophie goes to the parade and gets stuck behind
someone tall; these are all worlds in which Sophie does not see Pedro dance,
and so this counterfactual too comes out true. But reverse the order, and
things are very different. (6a) presupposes there are worlds in the relevant
domain in which Sophie goes to the parade and gets stuck behind someone
tall; these are worlds in which Sophie does not see Pedro dance and so (6a)
comes out true. But when we get to (6b), there are lots of worlds in which
Sophie goes to the parade in the domain already, and so the CCP has no
effect. But these worlds include ones in which Sophie does not see Pedro
dance (since she gets stuck behind someone tall), and so (6b) is false.
There are three elements that make this explanation work, and none of
them require treating the semantics of counterfactuals as involving CCPs.
First, the semantics of counterfactuals have to be sensitive to a set of worlds
determined by the conversational context. (This just requires context-sensitivity
in the semantics of counterfactuals, which everyone agrees does not require
a dynamic semantics.) Second, counterfactuals have to update the context
with the presuppositions introduced by their antecedents. Third, these up-
dates have to be the sort that survive to be the relevant input context for a
subsequent counterfactuals in the same discourse (i.e. the presupposition is
accommodated globally rather than locally). It’s these latter two that von
Fintel and Gillies think the CCP machinery is needed for, and for which I
think a pragmatic explanation can be naturally given.25
24This assumes, for the sake of argument, an ordering on worlds in which Sophie getting
stuck behind someone tall at the parade are farther away than worlds in which she goes
to the parade and does not get stuck behind someone tall.
25Moss (2012) also argues that the relevant data can be accounted for pragmatically,
though her view is significantly different from the one I propose. She argues that coun-
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If we accept von Fintel and Gillies’ claim that counterfactuals have these
presuppositions (and I’ll question whether we should accept that in a mo-
ment), we don’t need to adopt the dynamic semantic framework to account
for how or why the presuppositions get accommodated, since there are widely
accepted pragmatic notions of accommodation, following David Lewis and
Robert Stalnaker. If asserting something like (6a) really presupposes that
there are some Parade-and-Tall-worlds, and if it is uncontroversial that there
are such worlds, then the conversational participants accommodate, i.e. they
adjust the context minimally to include Parade-and-Tall worlds. We need not
appeal to something in the semantics of the counterfactual presuppositions
to explain this.26
Subordination explains why the addition of Parade-and-Tall worlds is a
change that sticks around for the duration of a string of counterfactual ut-
terances. In general, a context change induced by a modal, quantified or
conditional sentence will stick around until the modal, quantificational, or
conditional talk ends, since subsequent sentences are understood as subordi-
nated to previous ones as in:
(12) If there are non-specialists at the meeting, be sure to make your work
accessible to them. If they ask you a confused question, politely
clarify for them.
(13) A wolf might walk it. It would eat you first.
Unless the speaker can rule out the Parade-and-Tall worlds as irrelevant,
once introduced, they cannot be ignored. Notice that this is esentially the
same account for what is going on in (5) and (6) without appealing to CCPs.
terfactuals of the form If P & Q, would R raise to salience the might-counterfactual If
P, might Q, which pragmatically clashes with the relevant would-counterfactuals in these
cases (making them unassertable, not false). Again, my aim is to show that we can give a
theory that is essentially the same as the dynamic semantic account except that the up-
dates are pragmatic. Like on Gillies and von Fintel’s theories, the account I sketch predicts
that the problem in the reverse Sobel sequence is semantic rather than pragmatic.
26Of course, there is a longer argument that may be in the background: the idea that all
presuppositions should be treated as CCPs to explain presupposition projection. But this
is not the argument either of them make, and Gillies even says that the presuppositions
of counterfactuals are not really presuppositions at all, since they don’t pass the relevant
test. So even if one were motivated by the above reasoning for presuppositions in general
(which I am not), it would be hard for at least Gillies to have this in the background, since
his “presuppositions” aren’t real presuppositions in the first place.
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There are also other resources available for the static semantic/dynamic
pragmatic account. Since the so-called presuppositions on counterfactuals
don’t act much like presuppositions anyway, we can give up the idea that
there are such presuppositions, and stick with the idea that the entire se-
mantics of a counterfactual If P, would Q consists in the claim that the
P-worlds in the minimal domain are Q worlds. Like in the Lewis-Stalnaker
analysis, how worlds are ordered (and thus what ends up in the minimal do-
main) is contextually determined. Unlike the Lewis-Stalnaker account, one
way the context can change is that the minimal domain gets bigger when
salient possibilities that can’t be ruled out are introduced. (6a) raises to
salience the possibility that Sophie goes to the parade and gets stuck behind
someone tall. Salient possibilities, unless they can be ruled out, get added
to the relevant set of possibilities for evaluating counterfactuals.27
I’ve suggested two ways in which a static semantic/dynamic pragmatic
theorist could account for the discourse dynamics displayed by the differ-
ence between (5) and (6), giving an account that makes the same predictions
as that of von Fintel and Gillies in terms of which counterfactuals are true
and which are false, and why. But I would be remiss if I didn’t address
Gillies’s central reason for adopting CCPs: might-counterfactuals (von Fin-
tel does not talk about these). Gillies points out that there are sequences
very similar to the Sobel sequences that involve might-counterfactuals. The
contrast between these sequences cannot be explained by appealing to the
presuppositions of the antecedents:
(14) a. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro
dance; but, of course,
b. if Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have been stuck
behind someone tall and then wouldn’t have seen Pedro dance.
(15) a. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she might have been stuck
behind someone tall and then wouldn’t have seen Pedro dance;
but, of course,
b. ??if Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro
dance.
27Again this is close to, but different from, Moss (2012)’s account, since the possibility
raised to salience here is just ♦(P&Q), rather than If P, might Q.
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Gillies argues that might-counterfactuals presuppose the possibility that
there is an antedecent and consequent world, i.e. a might counterfactual If
P, might R presupposes ♦(P&R) (which is also its truth-conditional con-
tent). On his view, might-counterfactuals amount to instructions to add a
previously unconsidered possibility to the context, i.e., add the closest P&R-
worlds. Gillies argues that given the might data, we can’t treat content
statically with dynamic pragmatic update operations defined on top of static
contents. His argument goes as follows. If we take presuppositions to be re-
quirements on the definedness of a sentence, that is, the sentence expresses no
proposition unless the presupposition is satisfied, then we cannot treat mights
both statically and as the duals of woulds without encountering unwanted
falsehood or gappiness. Our first option is to say that might-counterfactuals
are true at a context if they are true when that context is updated with
their presupposition. In this case, might-counterfactuals are pretty much
everywhere true, including the input context for (14a), making the latter
false (where the intuition we want to capture is that it is true) — hence the
unwanted falsehood. Or, we could say that might-counterfactuals are true
in the updated context and get no truth value at the input context (where
the presupposition is unsatisfied). In this case, a lot of would-counterfactuals
that we thought were defined go from defined to undefined. Since If P, might
R is equivalent to ¬ (If P, would ¬R), and a negation sign never takes any-
thing from defined to undefined, whenever If P, might R is undefined, so is If
P, would ¬R, and Gillies is right to point out that this is a highly undesirable
result. Since Gillies’s semantics is CCPs all the way down instead of defined
in terms of truth, he avoids both these results. But we need not adopt a
dynamic semantics to avoid these results. Here are three ways to avoid this
problem while maintaining the ability to account for the contrast between
(14) and (15) in a similar way to Gillies.
All solutions require giving up the idea that ♦(P&R) is a definedness con-
dition on If P, might R, but I think there is good reason to give this up. The
first two solutions involve giving up ♦(P&R) as a presupposition. The third
solution involves giving up the idea that these are the sort of presuppositions
that dictate definedness conditions. All the options have the central solution
in common: might-counterfactuals, as well as woulds, are defined in con-
texts in which the alleged presuppositions are not satisfied. In such contexts,
would-counterfactuals are vacuously true, and might-counterfactuals false.
However, like most cases of accommodation, the context that is important
for evaluating the counterfactual is one in which the so-called presupposition
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is satisfied.
One reason to give up ♦(P&R) as a presupposition is to be consistent with
the option I presented above for the Sobel sequences that involved giving
up any sort of explanation in terms of presuppositions. Since the so-called
presuppositions don’t act much like presuppositions anyway, this path looks
like a natural one. Another reason to give it up is that ♦(P&R) looks even
less like a presupposition of might-counterfactuals than the presuppositions
on the antecedents of would-counterfactuals do. Gillies argues that the cases
are parallel, and should be treated as one phenomenon. But consider the
following contrast. Given certain facts about the conversation and the world
(such as the fact that I am an average basketball player and Kobe Bryant
doesn’t currently have casts on both arms), conversational participants are
likely to accept the first of these counterfactuals but not the second:
(16) If I had played one-on-one with Kobe Bryant yesterday and he had
casts on both arms, I would have won.
(17) If I had played one-on-one with Kobe Bryant yesterday, he might
have had casts on both arms, and then I would have won.
If Gillies is right, both of these counterfactuals have the same CCP; they
instruct the hearer to (permanently) add some one-on-one-and-cast-worlds
to the context and test to see if all those worlds are worlds in which I win
the match. Each is true if and only if this update is successful. But the first
is clearly true, while the second is not. So it seems that the roles that the
antecedents of woulds and the antecedents-plus-consequents of mights play
are actually different. (I will return to this in the next section, when I discuss
why the pragmatic view can better account for this contrast.)
So how to account for the contrast between (14) and (15)? I agree with
Gillies and Lewis (1979) that mights (whether counterfactual or on their
own) can serve to introduce new possibilities into the conversation that were
previously ignored. But I think this can be explained entirely by the seman-
tics of might-counterfactuals plus pragmatics. Take (14) for example. When
the conversation begins, the participants are considering as relevant only the
worlds in which Sophie goes to the parade and has a clear view. When a
speaker utters (14b), she must want to expand the set of worlds that are
relevant to the conversation, for at least two reasons. Since worlds in which
Sophie goes to the parade and gets stuck behind someone tall were not in
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the realm of relevant possibilities up until this point, if she doesn’t want to
expand the realm, then her utterance is irrelevant. Worse still, it is false,
and so she must intend to expand the context to make it true.28 The rest
of the conversational participants know this, and so the set of contextually
relevant worlds (in the minimal domain) is expanded.
The third way to avoid Gillies’ dilemma is to maintain that everything
he calls a presupposition is a presupposition, but deny that they are the
sort of presuppositions that are required for definedness. For example, the
presupposition associated with too is likely such an example:
(18) John went to a hockey game tonight, too.
(18) presupposes that some other conversationally salient individual went to
a hockey game on the night in question, but even if this presupposition fails,
we can still assign a truth value to the sentence based on whether John went
to a hockey game on the night in question. One might think that the same
holds for existence presuppositions on quantifiers.
(19) Every lawyer in Dawson City is a smoker.
(19) presupposes that there is at least one lawyer in Dawson City, but we
can still assign a truth value to it if the presupposition fails; it is vacuously
true since the set of lawyers minus the set of smokers is the empty set.
The upshot of this section and the last two is that the dynamic semantic
framework does look to be in a better position to explain communication
(at least about discourse dynamics) when we compare it to a static frame-
work that takes sentence contents to be sets of truth-supporting worlds and
pragmatics to work only off of sentence contents. But when we compare the
dynamic framework to the full range of static options, neither framework is
in an obviously better position than the other. The examples outlined in the
introduction of this paper don’t seem to offer any evidence (be it prima facie
or not) in favor of dynamic semantics when we allow that the static semanti-
cist has more tools in her toolbox than unstructured sets of truth-supporting
worlds that get fed to pragmatic machinery. Both frameworks seem to be in
28Or, at least she must either assume there is already such a possibility in the context
or that the context will be expanded to accommodate such a possibility. In this case, if
she assented to (14a), she has to assume the latter, but there are other cases, such as when
the might-counterfactual comes discourse initially, that it could be the former.
26
4 Some considerations against dynamic semantics Karen S. Lewis
an equally good position to offer the same style of explanation of how speak-
ers communicate changes that should be made to the context. How, then, to
decide between the two frameworks? In the following section, I explore some
ideas that speak in favor of the static semantic/dynamic pragmatic approach.
4 Some considerations against dynamic se-
mantics
Up until now, I’ve been arguing that the dynamic semantic framework doesn’t
put us in a better position than the static semantic framework in terms of
explaining the relationship between semantic value and communication, that
static semantics and neo-Gricean pragmatics (broadly construed) together
have the resources to give an account of discourse dynamics, including the
communication of discourse information, the effect of order on interpretation,
and the two-way interaction between context and content. Now I want to
suggest a few considerations as to why dynamic semantics puts us in a worse
position.
Dynamic semantics presents update rules as part of the recursive com-
positional semantic calculus (in fact, as the central semantic notion). This
suggests a systematicity in context change dictated by these rules. For ex-
ample, in Heim (1983) updating by intersection (the truth-conditional effect
of a full sentence or sentential clause) happens invariably, since it is just part
of the meaning of a sentence. As Beaver (2001) points out, “Heim provides
a method of stating semantics... in such a way that admittance conditions29
can be read off from the semantic definitions without having to be stipu-
lated separately” (p. 85). In virtually all dynamic semantic accounts of
unbound anaphora, the explanation involves something that is semantically
introduced by the antecedent which then provides a value for the pronoun
(either by binding it, putting constraints on it, or being bound by the same
higher quantifier). On the subject of counterfactuals, Gillies and von Fintel
argue that the worlds in the presupposition invariably expand the domain
of worlds — this is just the semantic effect of processing and accepting a
counterfactual.30 In fact, this systematicity is often cited as a central reason
29A formula is admitted in a context iff the context satisfies the presuppositions of the
formula.
30These are all provided the sentence is accepted. The update need not occur if the
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in favor of dynamic semantics. For example, Hardt (1999) writes:
Since Montague, a primary focus of semantics has been to de-
scribe a compositional method for constructing the logical repre-
sentation of a sentence meaning, and then evaluating that rep-
resentation with respect to a given context. A major insight of
dynamic semantics is that sentences have a systematic relation
to context in two ways: not only are they evaluated with respect
to the current context, but they also systematically change that
context.(p.187)
In the same vein, one of Heim’s central arguments against static views of
anaphora is that such theories can’t differentiate between the felicity of min-
imal pairs like the following:
(20) a. John has a spouse. She is nice.
b. John is married. ??She is nice.
(21) a. John has a bicycle. He rides it daily.
b. John is a bicycle-owner. ??He rides it daily.31
Though the second discourse in each pair is (more or less) equivalent to the
first, and each raises to salience John’s spouse and John’s bicycle, respec-
tively, the anaphoric pronoun is not felicitous (or at least significantly less
felicitous than in the first discourse). This is essentially to reiterate the same
point the marble case made.
I’ve been arguing that static semantics together with pragmatics can ac-
count for these sorts of updates (including these apparently systematic differ-
ences). But I think it can account for it better, because there are important
generalizations about context change that are best captured by a pragmatic
account. By putting the updates into the semantics, dynamic semantics
misses out on these generalizations. Semantically encoded aspects of mean-
ing are the conventional ones. But updates to the context seem like the sort
of things that are amenable to explanation from more basic principles of con-
versation, or rational co-operative activity in general, and not convention. In
particular, the pragmatic account has a natural explanation of why updates
sentence is not accepted by conversational participants.
31Heim (1982) p. 24
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to the context can vary with factors such as conversational purpose. And
the data is considerably more unsystematic than the arguments for dynamic
semantics would have us believe. While I am not arguing that dynamic se-
mantics couldn’t account for the variations in updates I’m about to point
out, I am arguing that there is no natural explanation that already falls out
of the explanation of the update rules, as in the pragmatic case. This feature
of the static semantic/dyanmic pragmatic account taken together with the
expressive resources I argued for above create a powerful reason to doubt
that dynamic semantics is the right semantics.
I have mentioned three sorts of updates in this paper: updates with truth-
conditional information (i.e. the elimination of worlds that conflict with as-
serted information), updates with a new discourse referent, and updates with
new worlds relevant for counterfactual discourse. I will consider them one
at a time. Whereas updating the context with the truth-conditional infor-
mation conveyed by an assertion was a part of the semantics for a dynamic
system like Heim’s, as I mentioned in §2, Stalnaker explains the same update
by appealing to the fact that rational agents who are engaged in an activity
with the purpose of gaining new information won’t keep around epistemic
possibilities that conflict with information that they have accepted. One
important advantage of the Stalnakerian explanation is that we can use the
same sort of reasoning to predict what sorts of updates to the context there
are in conversations with different purposes (i.e. ones in which the central
purpose is not inquiry into which world is actual). As we might expect, there
are different updates in a conversation where the purpose is, say, to get a
lot of suggestions on the table (e.g. a brainstorming session). In this sort
of conversation it is rational to keep around incompatible possibilities upon
accepting assertions, since the point of the conversation is to collect ideas
rather than rule them out.32 Another such example is court proceedings: if
one is on a jury, one does not want to update by intersection with the content
of what each witness says, but one still wants to update with information
that she said it. Given the different nature of a discourse in a courtroom,
32Some people have suggested that things like brainstorming sessions have implicit
modals that take scope over the whole discourse (or over each idea). Of course, there
are some conversations in which people say things like “we might do x” and “we might do
y”, and I’m sympathetic to the idea that this is implicit in brainstorming session where
it is not explicit. But notice that the static semantic/dynamic pragmatic theorist doesn’t
have to posit a tacit modal where there is no overt one — pragmatics alone explains what’s
going on in terms of the conversational updates.
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this difference in updating behavior is expected on the pragmatic account.33
Likewise, there are other sorts of conversations in which one expects one’s
interlocutor to contradict herself — for example, in speaking to politicians,
who are likely to lie or contradict themselves. In this case, update by inter-
section is not the best strategy since one knows inquiry is not the purpose of
the conversation and update by intersection will likely get us into the absurd
context — one where all worlds have been ruled out.
Another advantage of the pragmatic explanation of truth-conditional up-
date is that it is a natural extension of the same principles that guide our
updating based on non-linguistic events. To borrow an example of Stal-
naker’s, if a goat walks into the room while we’re having a conversation,
we’re both going to update with that information. That is, we’re both going
to eliminate worlds in which there are no goats that just walked into the
room. This is just a rational thing to do given that we take our experience at
face value (e.g., we do not believe we’re hallucinating). These are the same
principles of rationality that appear to be at work in conversation, so there
seems to be no need for divergent explanations of the phenomena.
The same holds for other sorts of updates. In §3.1, I suggested that
updates to the context about which objects are under discussion could be
explained in terms of the discourse plans and discourse expectations of ratio-
nal agents engaged in co-operative discourse. One of the advantages of this
sort of explanation is that it accounts for deviations from the standard data.
For example, in the marble case, it is generally agreed that the infelicitous
nine marble example becomes felicitous (or at least greatly improved) by a
long pause or a change of speakers in between the two sentences. Dynamic
semantics, in giving the phenomenon in question such a rigid, systematic
treatment, doesn’t have a natural explanation of this data. But the prag-
matic planning theory does: it is a lot more natural to expect a change in
discourse plans after a long pause or a change in speakers. Long pauses indi-
cate thinking, which is no doubt part of changing one’s mind about discourse
plans. And interpersonal discourse plans, especially on small things like what
object is currently under discussion, are a lot more likely to disagree than
33It is true that Grice’s own account is often criticized as not being able to account
for these sort of courtroom cases. But this is based on idiosyncracies of Grice’s actual
account, that is, that inducing belief in the hearer is the aim of assertion and that all cases
of conversation are cases of co-operative activity. As I said earlier, I am understanding
pragmatics broadly. In fact, it is precisely because such situations are not co-operative
that we expect different pragmatic effects in such cases.
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intrapersonal discourse plans.
For example, consider the following case from the movie When Harry met
Sally :
(22) a. Harry: I’m getting married.
b. Sally: You are? (Long pause in which Harry says “mmhmm”...)
You are. (Another pause.) Who is she?
This example is perfectly felicitous, which is surprising from a dynamic se-
mantic viewpoint that treats the relationship between the introduction of
discourse referent and anaphoric pronoun as semantic. Of course, a dynamic
semanticist could say in these cases that the discourse referent is added to the
context by accommodation, but this explanation seems ad hoc. By contrast,
on a pragmatic story, the explanation is a natural extension of the tools
already used in the standard case. In this example, it is clear that Harry
has a discourse plan to tell Sally about his impending marriage. Marriage is
already a topic of conversation at this point, since Sally has just told Harry
that she has no interest in marriage at all. But Sally finds Harry extremely
annoying and is shocked that anyone would want to marry him, and there-
fore clearly has a plan to switch the conversation to talk of his fiance´e. The
long pause indicating Sally thinking, as well as the change in speakers, make
the conversational participants (and anyone watching the movie) primed to
accept a change in conversational plan. And since it is utterly unambiguous
about whom Sally is asking, the pronoun sounds perfectly fine.
In general, in circumstances in which the speaker’s intentions are perfectly
clear, and it is obvious why the speaker chose the circumlocutory route, ex-
amples like the so-called infelicitous marble example are perfectly acceptable.
For example, the following is from a real life conversation between myself and
a friend of mine. We were at a conference and both of us expected a certain
person to be there, but did not want to let on to other people around us who
we were talking about. Observing to herself that this person was not present
at the conference, we had the following exchange:
(23) a. Her: I noticed that not everyone is here.
b. Me: I know. I heard he was going to be late.
Again, these sort of common exceptions to the norm are unexpected on a
dynamic account of context update with discourse referents, but not surpris-
ing on a view in which context update in general has to do with recognizing
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speaker’s intentions. Like in the truth-conditional update case, there are
similar mechanisms at work in the non-linguistic arena. If a goat walks
into the room, we might update the conversational context with a discourse
referent for the goat, upon the reasonable assumption that someone in the
conversation is going to want to talk about the goat.
The same holds for the case of counterfactual conditionals. As Gillies
is well aware, the update mechanism expands the relevant domain in the
context, but there is no mechanism for shrinking the domain. The problem
is the domain can shrink, and it can shrink a lot more easily and a lot more
often than the dynamic semanticist should be comfortable with. For instance,
the basketball example I gave above is a case in which considering P-and-
Q-worlds does not have the effect of adding P-and-Q-worlds to the domain
in any permanent way. As a reminder: we are considering a case in which I
actually have average basketball skills and Kobe Bryant did not have casts
on his arms yesterday. In this case, the reverse Sobel sequence sounds just
fine:
(24) a. If I had played one-on-one with Kobe Bryant yesterday and he
had casts on both arms, I would have won.
b. But of course, if I had played one-on-one with Kobe Bryant
yesterday, I would have lost.
If Gillies wants to account for this, he has to introduce some sort of shrinking
mechanism — and it’s not clear how to do so in a non-ad hoc way on a
dynamic semantic account. On the pragmatic story, however, the felicity
of the above sequence is completely expected. The pragmatic explanation
for adding worlds to the global context (i.e. the sort of update that sticks
around) is that once possibilities are made salient by the antecedent (or once
the presuppositions are accommodated) they cannot be ignored unless they
can be ruled out. Since Kobe Bryant did not have casts on his arms yesterday,
we can safely rule out the worlds in which he does as relevant possibilities.34
Thus the reverse Sobel sequence sounds fine. Since we can’t rule out Sophie
getting stuck behind a tall person at the parade, those worlds stick around as
part of the input context to subsequent (subordinate) counterfactuals. When
we can rule out such worlds, reverse Sobel sequences are not infelicitous.
34Moss (2012) makes a similar proposal about shrinking contexts.
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Again, this is natural on the pragmatic account, and would be unexpected if
the dynamic semantic account was right.35
The examples of the 3 kinds of updates — involving truth conditions,
discourse referents, and the presuppositions of counterfactuals — all face
similar problems when they are put into the recursive compositional calculus
in a dynamic semantic account. They are too systematic, resistant to the
many exceptions to these update rules. Again, this is not to say that the dy-
namic semanticist can’t offer some mechanism to explain the phenomena I’ve
pointed out. But the dynamic semantic framework does not offer a natural
explanation, and the existence of these “exceptions” undermines the motiva-
tion for including updates in the recursive compositional calculus. Instead,
the data is suggestive of a pragmatic account, which not only has the ability
to naturally explain the variance in updates to the context, but actually pre-
dicts the precise variance in many cases. This doesn’t rule out that there are
other good arguments for dynamic semantics out there. I haven’t addressed
motivations stemming from entailment relations, discourse relations (as in
SDRT), or the fact that dynamic semantics can treat declaratives, interrog-
atives, and imperatives as a single kind of semantic object (i.e. CCPs). But
I have undermined one central motivation for dynamic semantics – one that
looks at discourse dynamics – and I think the pragmatic nature of context
change should generally give us pause when considering whether to adopt a
dynamic semantic framework.
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